


























































Changes in the security environment in the post-cold war period have raised questions, especially in the European context, about the relevance and effectiveness of NATO, the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations in dealing with certain types of threat. Three questions in particular have been prominent. Firstly, should non-military security aspects be included and/or given the same weight as military aspects in the assessment of threats? Secondly, will NATO continue to be the primary security organisation in Europe, or will the EU gradually replace NATO in this regard? Thirdly, will NATO and the EU engage in fruitful cooperation in the pursuance of security tasks, and thus contribute to a European wide system of governance, or not? While the debate about the definition of security threats will continue, one way in which at least partial answers to these questions can be provided is to explore the performance of security organisations with regard to security functions such as conflict prevention, peace-enforcement, peace-keeping and peace-building, which will be done here. Another aim of this article will be to examine how the various security institutions cooperate in the pursuance of these security functions and to assess whether and how performance of these functions contributes to purposive governance. Although well-documented data is emerging on the Balkan region, this is the exception rather than the rule. In the absence of in-depth analysis of cases and outcomes, the assessment on performance will rely primarily on the stated aims and means of the security institutions under examination. For similar reasons, the paper will not be able to make a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of security institutions in, for example, conflict prevention. The absence or limited occurrence of a given regional conflict cannot be seen in itself as a measure of, for example, EU effectiveness.​[1]​

Notwithstanding these limitations, the empirical data will be able to help shed some light on the utility of the concept of security governance in explaining the management of security policy in Europe. Security governance has been defined by Webber et al (2004:3) as, ‘the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the intervention of both public and private actors (depending on the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed towards particular policy outcomes.’

Notwithstanding these limitations, the empirical data will be able to help shed some light on the utility of the concept of security governance in explaining the management of security policy in Europe. Security governance has been defined by Webber et al (2004:3) as, ‘the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the intervention of both public and private actors (depending on the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed towards particular policy outcomes.’

The changing nature of security threats
Reference to non-military security threats reopens  contentions  as to whether they are security problems per se or simply causes of more traditional security problems (see, for example, Baldwin, 1997). However, there is general agreement that the nature of security threats is changing, and that threats since the end of the Cold War have become more complex and far-reaching (Cottey and Averre, 2002). Instead of facing a single, predominantly military threat capable of wiping out the entire nation (and the world), we are faced with a myriad of threats, smaller in magnitude and harder to see and counter. This phenomenon was tragically visible in the terrorist attacks of 11 September; attacks which demonstrated that networked terrorism has become de-personalised and de-regionalised and highlight the fact that the terrorist threat is global and cannot be reduced to individual actors. Changes in the nature of security threats were recognised in the European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council in December 2003, which singles out terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime as the five key threats facing the EU. However, realisation of the changing security environment is not new. As the NATO Council​[2]​ already noted in 1991, the “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage.” NATO​[3]​ repeated the point in its 1999 Strategic Concept, this time moving “acts of terrorism” to the top of the list of risks. These adjustments to the hierarchy of risks weaken the distinctions between different kinds of security – national and regional, military and economic, internal and external – but also indicate a link between different types of security threat. For example, it is no longer possible to separate terrorism from money laundering, or organised crime from drug trafficking (Hall and Fox (2001:8). Mass population movements may raise the possibility of infectious diseases spreading widely to affect both people and livestock. On the other hand, migration can be exacerbated by environmental instability arising from climatic change.  Similarly, the emergence of cyber-terrorism can be considered as constituting a dangerous threat to economic and social life in Europe. It is therefore impossible to “wage [war] against one [threat] to the exclusion of the other” (Hall and Fox, 2001:8). After September 11 internal security is as important as external security. This is particularly relevant for the EU with regards to enlargement.  

Changes in security threats have encouraged efforts to move beyond the state centric approach. As Buzan et al (1998) point out, the concept of security relates, not only to the preservation of state boundaries, but also to the protection of societies and individuals within states. Accordingly, security for Buzan (1991) is the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity. While threats to the territory of states are identified primarily in military terms, societies and individuals face a multitude of dangers ranging from the inadequacies of political and social structures, to environmental degradation (Krahmann, 2003).

Important for both military and non-military security threats is perception. The term ‘securitisation’ signifies a process by which particular issues are “taken out of the sphere of every day politics” by specific groups or particular state elites, and defined as security problems (Krause, 1998). In this respect security is considered, not as a direct consequence stemming from a threat, but as the result of the political interpretation of the threat. Therefore security is analysed as the reaction of a political  action towards an existing or perceived threat. Securitisation is thus a merely political process and is different from a threat that can be caused by various factors (economic, social, military, etc.). 

It is this interpretation that informed the study by Kirchner and Sperling (2002). This study identifies twelve conceivable security threats to the European security space​[4]​ and depicts NATO and the EU as the primary security institutions, with secondary roles attributed to the UN, the OSCE and international financial institutions. It also lists the EU as the first port of call for dealing with the six highest-ranking security threats (ethnic conflicts, migratory pressures, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, macro-economic instability, and terrorism); all of which are deemed non-military security threats.

The EU, operating as it does over a wide range of civilian policy domains and some military means, can be seen as having an obvious advantage over other multi-lateral organisations or non-state actors. It can count on more numerous and varied instruments of influence than NATO, especially at the level of conflict prevention, and could therefore have a comparative advantage over NATO in managing potential conflict situations (Brenner, 2002: 71). But how much of the perceived EU advantage has been or is likely to be translated into concrete results? Scholars such as Christopher Hill (1993) question the EU’s capacity in the foreign and security fields and point to a “capability-expectations gap”.  Shedding light on the performance of security institutions requires empirical studies, which will be attempted in what follows.

Performance of Security Functions
The response by security institutions to the perceived security threats can be divided into four broad categories all of which are involved in the achievement of collective goals (the establishment of peace and stability), the prescription of norms for interaction and constraints on the behaviour of states or non-state-actors. These are conflict prevention, peace-making or peace-enforcement, peace-keeping and peace-building. Conflict prevention relates to situations in which a major conflict can be avoided and implies an emphasis on financial and technical assistance; economic cooperation in the form of trade or association agreements, or enlargement provisions; nation building and democratisation efforts. Conflict prevention generally requires a long-term commitment. Peace-making or peace-enforcement refers to instances where a major conflict has occurred and where the emphasis is on preventing escalation. Short-term measures are usually called for. Peace-making, as understood here, is mostly linked with economic and political efforts which may range from economic sanctions to political mediation/negotiations between the warring parties involved in a conflict. However, as such efforts have often proved to be ineffective, they have to be linked with actual military interventions in the form of peace-enforcement. Peace-keeping refers to the engagement of troops for the purpose of “keeping” the agreed peace settlement after a major conflict, and peace-building is concerned with post-conflict reconstruction and the re-establishment of peace, preferably on a permanent basis. These activities are usually of a medium term nature.​[5]​ Obviously, there are overlaps among these four categories, but for analytical purposes they will be treated separately. An examination of these will in turn help to identify the areas where cooperation, coordination and a division of labour among the major security institutions is most needed or most appropriate. As indicated earlier in the paper, in the absence of in-depth analysis of cases and outcomes, the assessment on performance will rely primarily on the stated aims and means of the security institutions under examination. Similarly, it will refrain from assessing effectiveness of the security institutions in the performance of a given security function, e.g. whether a given conflict was prevented or resolved by a single organisation. We will start by considering conflict prevention.

1. Conflict Prevention 
Conflict prevention may emerge from different sources and can engage a wide array of instruments. General prevention aims at tackling the root causes of potentially violent conflicts such as economic inequality and deficient democracy, as well as exclusive state-and nation-building strategies. By contrast, special prevention employs specific measures aimed at a specific conflict at a specific stage (Zellner, 2002:18-19). It is accepted that economic development, reducing economic disparity, and reducing poverty are important precursors to building stability and preventing the escalation of violence in volatile areas (Eavis & Kefford, 2002:9). Economic, financial/technical, and political efforts can be particularly effective when dealing with security threats such as organised crime, narcotics trafficking, environmental problems (including nuclear safety), migratory pressures, and low-level ethnic conflicts. Indirectly, they may also help to contain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the activities of international terrorist organizations. When compared with crisis management situations, conflict prevention measures appear mundane, less dramatic and often medium to long term oriented. A host of organizations, ranging from NGO’s and financial/technical organizations to the EU, NATO and the OESC, are involved in conflict prevention measures. These organizations combine to “entrench particular forms of behaviour among their participants by prescribing rules of entry, norms of interaction and constraints on behaviour” (Keohane, 1998:384). However, with its ability to combine such a wide range of activities, the EU plays a lead role in conflict prevention, as demonstrated below.

In the European context, the EU combines economic cooperation (e.g., the Euro- agreements) with financial/technical assistance (e.g the PHARE, TACIS and Balkan programmes),​[6]​ political dialogue (e.g., the dialogue with the Russian Federation),​[7]​ enlargement conditions (K. Smith, 1998), Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (concentrating on Southeastern Europe and the Caucasus) and explicit stabilisation association agreements as in Macedonia and Croatia, for example. With regards to accession countries, the EU can link these activities effectively with EU policies, evident in the fields of environment and justice and home affairs, including Europol. To show this more clearly, after 11th September, the EU adopted a common position on the war against terrorism and agreed on a common definition of terrorist offences and a Europe-wide arrest warrant (abolishing cumbersome extradition procedures) which came into effect on 1st January 2004. Attempts have also been made to overcome problems concerning visa and immigration regulations; to establish an EU-wide fingerprint database for asylum seekers; to freeze suspected al Qaeda financial assets; and to introduce limits on association rights for groups that claim to be religious but may actually be terrorist support networks (Delpech, 2002).  Furthermore, the EU has established a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit to enhance the capacity for monitoring post conflict situations and policy planning, a conflict prevention programme of action, and agreed on Joint Action on the EU’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons. 

Hence, in dealing with Central and Eastern European countries, the EU is in a unique position for linking structural reforms with democratization and security interests. The impact of these activities is set to raise levels of prosperity and strengthen civil society in these countries. In turn this will contribute to reductions in organised crime, including narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities and ethnic conflicts, and will lead to a rise in environmental standards, including the safekeeping of nuclear weapons in Russia and of nuclear reactors. In addition, as enlargement continues, it will bring the EU into direct contact with the Caucasus and closer to Central Asia. Given the prevailing high level of instability in this entire region, the EU is keen to reduce the risk of conflict spilling over into the Union.

Neither NATO nor the OSCE can dispose of or combine activities in a similar manner, although both make important contributions to conflict prevention through the political and security dialogue. In NATO’s case, this involves mainly the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Joint Partnership Council (EAPC), the Pacts with Russia and the Ukraine, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the links with the South East Europe Initiative, the Balkan Stability Pact, the Council of the Baltic Sea State, and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Through these programmes, as well as the enlargement criteria, NATO has encouraged its members (including prospective ones) to respect minorities, resolve disputes peacefully, and ensure civilian control of their military establishments (Talbott, 2002:47). All these complement NATO’s long standing disarmament and confidence building efforts in Europe, e.g., the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 

The OSCE’s instruments for conflict prevention consist of the Conflict Prevention Centre, the more than one hundred long-term field missions, the Institution of High Commissioner for National Minorities, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (Zellner 2002). Some of these bodies are also involved in crisis management and post-conflict peace-building activities.  The OSCE cooperates (predominantly through the Charter for European Security) with a wide range of other IGOs and international and local NGOs.

Another link organization is the European Platform for Conflict Prevention, established in 1997. The Platform – a network of more than 150 organizations working in the field of the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts in the international arena - aims to provide comprehensive information and support for the conflict prevention and transformation activities of the different players in the field. It also strives to stimulate networking and improved coordination. Connecting local with international NGOs, practitioners, academics, donor agencies, policymakers and media provides a useful vehicle for sharing experiences from various perspectives. The European Centre for Conflict Prevention acts as the secretariat of the European Platform (van Tongeren et al, 2002:xiv). 

Moving beyond the European context, it is well recognised that poverty and a sense of hopelessness and injustice are breeding grounds for terrorism in many parts of the Islamic and third world. The host of EU Association Agreements that give financial/technical aid and access to European markets can be seen as an aid to economic growth and political stability. They contain clauses on respect for human rights, political pluralism and standards for good governance. In the case of the Association Agreement with the three Maghreb states, it can be considered as providing alternatives to Islamism in these countries (Hanelt and Neugart, 2003).  Between 1993-2000  the EU and individual member states were the largest donors of financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority as well as to the Middle East peace process in general (Asseburg, 2003:12). Europe contributes 37 per cent of the United Nations’ basic budget and 50 per cent of the UN’s special programme costs (Pond, 2002:224), and is responsible for 70 per cent of global foreign aid (Moravcsik, 2004:86). The EU has also been instrumental in setting international environmental standards and in establishing an International Criminal Court.

With regards to the conflict prevention function, it can thus be said that, while all the above institutions make significant contributions or reinforce each others’ activities, the EU, because of its degree of jurisdiction, economic scope, standard-setting facilities, diplomatic and (increasingly) military tools, stands out as the key actor for this function.  As M. Smith (1997) has suggested, “the EU has the economic capacity to reward and punish; it has the technical and administrative capacity to support and stabilise; and it has the capacity to negotiate in ways unknown to many of the other participants in European order”.

2. Peace-Making/Enforcement
Peace enforcement exercises relate to actual conflict or crisis management situations, such as the various Balkan cases between 1992 and 2001, or the prolonged conflict between Israel and Palestine. Although the EU has tried to resolve such conflicts with either economic sanctions (e.g., former Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe) or diplomatic means (e.g., Iraq and North Korea in 2003), such efforts have invariably failed and the solutions have in several instances required military intervention. A similar fate has beset efforts by the OSCE (e.g., 1998 in Kosovo) and the UN (e.g., in former Yugoslavia and Cyprus). Only in the March 2001 Macedonian conflict, with the evacuation of UCK insurgents and their weapons, where it worked in tandem with NATO, did the EU play a significant role in restoring peace and preventing the spread of armed conflict (Brenner, 2002:55). By contrast, NATO, due to its newly re-vamped role of out-of-area engagement, demonstrated both relevance and effectiveness in dealing with the Balkan conflicts. Below is a brief examination of EU shortcomings in the field of peace enforcement due largely to the lack of political will, of decision-making capacity, and of action (primarily military).

Political will: Although a common habit of thinking and an awareness of similar interests is growing among EU member states, there is still a lack of trust among the major EU states when it comes to security and defence considerations or intelligence sharing. Indeed, the rival historical and political interests of European states prevent the very definition of a common European security identity (Hix, 1999), and induce European governments to regard the Union’s security organisations as mere instruments for achieving their own foreign policy goals. In other words, ‘national’ rather than ‘collective’ interests continue to dominate EU members’ calculations in assessing the risks posed by, and the responses to, common security threats (Kirchner and Sperling, 2000). EU enlargement will not make this task any easier. Already there are signs that the new partners will have a rather passive attitude vis-a-vis CFSP/ESDP issues (Missiroli, 2003). The collective action problems are evident in the limited remit of ESDP, which is to perform the ‘Petersberg tasks’  - that is, humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. 

Decision-making capacity: The required bodies and decision-making structures for ESDP were belatedly established (1999-2003), e.g., the High Representative for CFSP, the Policy Unit, the Joint Situation Centre, the Political and Security Committee, the European Union Military Committee, and the European Union Military Staff; all regrouped or attached to the Council of Ministers. New methods of decision-making, such as “enhanced cooperation” or “constructive abstention” have been introduced for consideration. The European Security Strategy (2003:11) seeks ambitiously to foster “early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention”. However, there is still no Council of Defence Ministers or defence budget. In addition, there is a reliance on unanimity voting in decision-making. Unless reforms can be introduced, the latter will become more protracted in the enlarged EU. Moreover, work between the Council of Ministers and the European Commission is not adjusted to constitute a coherent whole; instead they compete with each other on mandates and competencies (Rusi, 2001; Youngs, 2004).

Military capacity: EU military capacity is undermined by the existence of: (a) different armies, air forces and navies, all with their command structures, headquarters, logistical organisations, and training infrastructures; (b) too high a proportion of immobile ground forces; and (c) problems of interoperability among European forces. The EU is lagging behind in advanced information technology, air-and sea-lifts,​[8]​ air refueling, and precision-guided munitions. The Eurofighter project will create more capacity, but states do not pool from it. A considerable part of these deficiencies relates either to under-spending​[9]​ or uncoordinated military spending, e.g., waste of duplication and an inability to take advantage of economies of scale, especially with regard to research and development, though a European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency was belatedly established in 2004. Overall, the EU lacks a security and defence planning system. These deficits will not, for the foreseeable future, be overcome, in-spite of the fact that the EU is in the process of establishing a Rapid Reaction Force through the allocation of national troops (65,000 in total) and military equipment. 

Overall, NATO has a distinct advantage in peace-enforcement activities over the OSCE, the UN and, for the time being, the EU. If the UN or the OSCE want to evoke peace- enforcement in situations of, for example, intense ethnic strife, they will either call on or delegate authority to NATO or the EU to carry out such activities. Of course, as seen in the Kosovo conflict, NATO has carried out peace-enforcement tasks without a UN mandate. However, the non-use of NATO forces in Afghanistan (2001/02) and Iraq (2003) have raised questions about the relevance of NATO in peace-enforcement operations. Limitations on NATO peace-enforcement exercises are linked to Defence Secretary Rumsfeld’s famous dictum that the task determines the coalition rather than the coalition determining the task. From a US point of view, both the difficulties of consensus building encountered in the Kosovo conflict of 1999 (war by committee) and the preference for unilateral action, or pre-emptive strikes, after the events of 11th September 2001, have exposed the limitations of NATO in regard to peace-enforcement missions. Whether this will be a temporary phenomenon remains to be seen, as does the extent the to which the EU will become active and effective in this field. Improvements by the EU in this respect will mean deciding whether to augment its autonomous military capacities and security policies or seek to make use of NATO planning and logistical support, as foreseen under the Berlin-plus accord.

3. Peace-keeping 
The UN and especially NATO have played a major role in terms of peace-keeping activities in the Balkans. However, the EU is starting to increase its role in this field.
Actual peace-keeping forces were led by the UN until 1996, through UNPROFOR, and then taken over by NATO through IFOR and SFOR (1998) to secure peace in Bosnia. NATO was also in command of the peace-keeping forces in Kosovo (KFOR) and Macedonia. However, the European countries provided more than 60% of the 20,000 troops in Bosnia, the 37,000 in Kosovo, as well as all the troops in Macedonia. Moreover, the NATO mission in Macedonia was transferred to the EU in March 2003. Operation Concordia, as it was known, consisted of 300 soldiers drawn from most of the EU countries. It operated under the Berlin-plus arrangements and included the involvement of EU military staff embedded in the NATO operational headquarters at SHAPE. In 2004, it was replaced by an EU police training force (see below). A similar take-over by the EU is envisaged for NATO’s SFOR mission in Bosnia.

Summer 2003 marked two interesting new developments, with announcements by the EU and NATO that they would undertake peace-keeping activities outside the European orbit. In July 2003, 1,400 French-led EU troops were engaged, at the UN’s request, in their first peace-keeping mission in Congo. Noteworthy was that the EU did not involve NATO and therefore did not make use of the “Berlin-plus” rules which allow the US certain controls over EU-led peace-keeping in return for NATO planning and assets.​[10]​ Importantly this engagement was linked to European Security Strategy, announced in June 2003 and adopted by the European Council in December 2003, which calls for ‘greater capacity to bring civilian resources such as police and judges to bear in crisis and post-crisis situations. Operation Artemis, as it was called, contributed to an improvement in the security situation, the return of refugees, and the revival of economic life (Faria, 2004:43). It worked closely with a number of humanitarian agencies and NGOs. Artemis lasted for three months and was replaced by a UN force. It allowed the EU to play a ‘bridging’ function, giving the UN time to mount a new operation or to reorganize an existing one. To foster this type of cooperation, a Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management was signed in September 2003 that foresees a rapid deployment of appropriate military capabilities according to an agreed duration and end-state. In line with this accord, Britain, France and Germany announced in the spring of 2004 the establishment of so-called battle-groups, 1500 in strength, capable of being deployed within fifteen days and to operate under a UN mandate. The missions will last up to thirty days and will be “appropriate”, but not limited to use in failed or failing states.

NATO, for its part, seized control of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in August 2003. This marked its first operation outside Europe in its 54-year existence. In August 2004, NATO’s was co-joined by the five-nation Eurocorps to command the UN’s mandated peace-keeping and peace-building action. It is too early to assess whether the Congo or the Afghan peace-keeping engagements will become new trends, although this appears more likely for NATO than for the EU. 

4. Peace-building
Peace-keeping (military forces in combat) and peace-building (institution building, democratisation and governance) tasks go hand-in-hand and are usually of a medium-term duration. In the European context, the major security organisations share in the implementation of these tasks. The work of the NATO peace-keeping forces is complemented by the peace-building activities of the OSCE, the UN and the EU. For example, the OSCE’s Office of High Representative is in charge of the civilian aspect of the rebuilding of Bosnia, the United Nations runs an Interim (civilian) Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and is active through its UNHCR, while the EU is charged with aiding the economic development of Kosovo. A 500-strong EU police mission (EUPM) replaced the UN International Police Task Force in Bosnia in the beginning of 2003 to train, monitor and assist the Bosnian police in law enforcement duties for a three-year period. Since the beginning of 2004, the EU has mounted a similar police mission in Macedonia, known as EUPOL-PROXIMA, to replace the peace-keeping force (Concordia). It also represents a take-over of the police mission that the OSCE had carried out previously. 

The best example of how peace-keeping and peace-building work side-by-side, and of how various organisations interact with each other to provide military, civilian and economic assistance, is the Stability Pact for the Balkans. This Pact was initiated by the EU; is supported by over forty nations, regional bodies, and international organisations, all working in partnership; and operates under the auspices of the OSCE. It has three working principles: pursuing democracy building and human rights violations; building infrastructure to rehabilitate society; and promoting reform of the security sector for more accountable, transparent rules of law enforcement. In addition to this Pact, the EU offers stabilisation and association agreements to, for example, Croatia and Macedonia that combine the opening up of local markets, technical assistance and political dialogue.

Although the concern in this paper has been primarily the more narrowly confined European security geographic space, impacts on European security from further afield, especially the Middle East, cannot be excluded, and deserve at least brief consideration. In the Middle East, the EU has deliberately kept its role nonpolitical, preferring EU trade concessions, investment, technical and humanitarian assistance; after the 1993 Oslo Accords, it provided funding for the Palestinian Authority positions. Some of the economic and financial aid is directed to the peace process and to support the creation of effective, democratic Palestinian institutions (Ortega, 2003:9). Through the “Barcelona Process” it has also provided a forum for discreet contacts between Israelis and Palestinians during the breakdown of their peace process. However, the failings of these efforts were recognised in the remarks of Solana that the region should become a playing ground, not just a paying ground for the EU (Nonneman, 2003:45).

Inter-institutional Cooperation and Security Governance
The above review of the four security functions has illustrated the comparative advantages of each organisation in the four respective categories. What emerges is that, while some organisations are better equipped to deal with certain threats than with others, and while there is considerable overlap among the security organizations in the performance of security functions, none of these organisations are effective enough on their own to deal with the changing nature of security threats in the post-Cold War period (Kirchner and Sperling, 2002). When comparing the two lead institutions, NATO and the EU, it can be said that NATO is ill-equipped to provide solutions to the dilemmas of collective action posed by new security threats such as trans-national crime, cyber-warfare and terrorism (Gordon, 2002; for a counterview see Stevenson, 2003). In contrast, the EU system of governance has certain advantages in this respect.  The offer of membership, the financial and technical assistance programmes and the strictures of the acquis communautaire enable the EU to prevent or discourage the emergence of weak civil societies, corrupt state structures or the criminalisation of economies (Reiter, 2001). Reliance upon the EU system of governance also retains the possibility of integrating the military and the non-military components of the European security agenda.

However, in spite of these potential advantages in foreign and security policy, the EU suffers from too much rhetoric and too little action when it comes to dealing with international crisis situations, such as the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. It has somewhat improved this picture with the joint EU-NATO intervention in Macedonia, its uniformly solid backing of the U.S. after the attacks of 11th September, and the willingness to undertake peace-keeping and peace-building engagements in the Balkans and the Congo, as well as through Eurocorps in Afghanistan. There now also exist structures and (planned) capabilities at EU level in terms of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), the Civilian Police Force, and the various committees which have been set up to facilitate decisions on a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Adreani et al, 2001). Nonetheless, its strength lies more in long-term measures such as conflict prevention or peace-building than in intervening actively in crisis situations which require immediate military action. It has therefore some way to go to become an effective actor in international crisis situations and to establish the necessary collective capacity, especially with regard to military expenditures, air and sea logistics, and modern warfare technology. While NATO has much greater military capabilities, it also has experienced difficulties that have hindered their application in Afghanistan and Iraq.​[11]​ From a policy-making point of view, collaboration and cooperation between the two leading security institutions, NATO and the EU, would be beneficial. It would help achieve cost savings (avoiding expensive duplications), streamline joint operations, ensure an effective blending between military and non-military instruments, and promote a collective output in the pursuance of peace, stability and order in Europe; criteria which have been associated with the working of security governance. 

Space will not allow an in-depth treatment of the concept of security governance.​[12]​ Suffice it to say that it provides a framework for analyzing policy making and policy implementation in the security field (Webber et al, 2004; Krahmann, 2003). It alerts us to the multiple actors and multiple levels of security actor engagements. It captures the different categories of cooperative arrangements (from loose to structured) among states and international organizations or NGOs and highlights the importance of ‘shared understanding’ among the leading security organisations: NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the UN. However, the assumption of governance analysts that existing actors and coordinating mechanisms do collectively add up to a form of governance, in the sense that governance is understood as an absence of hierarchical forms of authority, or as the presence of ‘heterarchy’ (Webber et al, 2004), might be more contestable. Yes, coordinating mechanisms prevail among the leading security organizations NATO and the EU. They include the NATO-EU dialogue, the Berlin-plus mechanism, the Contact Group, the NATO-Russia Council, the Treaty on Convention Forces Europe (CFE), the Confidence Building System Measures (CBSMs), the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), the EU Political Dialogue with Russia and the EU New Neighbourhood Policy. Following the successful EU mission in the Congo, there is also growing collaboration between the EU and UN. But do these coordinating mechanisms enable security organisations to reinforce each others’ activities in such a way that purposive security governance is ensured? In the case of the Stability Pact for the Balkans the answer is affirmative. In order to bring more lasting solutions to the Balkan conflicts, which threatened to extend Europe-wide, states acknowledged the limitations (financial and military capacity) of acting alone and opted for coordinating policy within international organisations in an effort to share and coordinate their military and non-military capacities. The actors engaged in European security governance were numerous (e.g., states, institutions, NGOs, networks, private and public), related to one other by consultation and lacked any formal, established hierarchy.  Overall the involved international organisations adopted sets of rules and prescribed behavioural roles.  In a rough division of labour, the UN stood as a legitimiser and a provider of action; NATO operated militarily; the EU acted as a ‘shaper’ of democratic norms; and the OSCE attempted to ensure personal safety by insisting upon and monitoring human rights standards. The responsibilities taken by the various actors were limited but purposeful, involving targeted goals, for a specific period and region. The actions undertaken were voluntary and based on persuasion rather than coercion; neither do they appear to have been part of a grand design. All this points to the incremental development of a new political and security order, with no overarching security system covering the whole of the European continent and no clear prescription of the roles of the principal institutions (NATO, the OSCE and EU) (Cottey and Averre, 2002:21), or of their relationships to one another. Hence the response to the Balkan conflicts can be seen as the aggregation of a series of overlapping arrangements that govern the activities of the affected and participating states across a range of separate, but mutually reinforcing, issue areas. 

However, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the initial efforts of peace-making and peace-enforcement were a crucial factors for the subsequent peace-keeping and peace-building activities in the Balkans. Noteworthy is also that conflict prevention measures had not worked, making peace-enforcement action necessary. In addition, the fall-outs of the military intervention in Kosovo (US complaints of “war by committee”), the September 11, 2001 event and the Iraq conflict of 2003, have lead to differences among the main international actors about the timing and methods of interventions in crises situations. These disagreements manifest themselves most starkly in the US doctrine of “pre-emption” (largely of a military kind) and the EU emphasis, on “preventive engagement” (mostly involving diplomatic and economic tools). The former has implications for how to deal with so-called rogue states, e.g., the United States’ preferences for unilateral or selective NATO engagements. The latter will put pressure on the EU when responding to demands for a new burden-sharing with the US in a new world order (Ulriksen and Bono, 2004:570). It will also have bearings on how far the EU should go in establishing autonomous security and defence capabilities, or in carrying out autonomous actions. In other words prevailing differences heighten the unresolved issue of whether a build-up EU capability for military action will be a mini-NATO with a European face, or be a force in its own right. One consequence of the difference in transatlantic relations has been that the threat posed by transnational terrorism has not given rise to the sort of coordinated cooperation at a pan-European level that might point to a systemic response. Were these differences to escalate, they could result in a collective weakening of security governance, especially if a major crisis were to occur which required substantial military activities. 

Conclusion
Developments in post-Cold War Europe have introduced new challenges in terms of changing security threats and the enlargement of both the EU and NATO, but they have also provided opportunities for cooperation among states and security organisations in meeting these challenges and in providing security governance. A great number of organisations are involved in performing the functions of conflict prevention, peace-enforcement, peace-keeping and peace-building. The tendency to declare NATO the prime security organisation in Europe is to some extent understandable (see, for example, Croft (2002), as it is the only organisation with the required military capacity to perform substantial peace-enforcement and peace-keeping actions, often in extremely critical and risky situations. This allows NATO the unique ability to halt the escalation of any given conflict. What is not acceptable is the corresponding tendency to underplay the contributions of the EU. Due to its breadth of jurisdiction, economic scope, financial assistance, standard-setting facilities, diplomatic and (increasingly) military tools, the EU has the capacity to respond to a greater number of security threats and, to some in greater depth than either NATO or other security institutions. Its strength, for the time being, lies in conflict prevention and peace-building exercises, which have a long-term perspective, rather than in peace-enforcement or peace-keeping that require short-term measures, primarily of a military kind.  The importance of this should not be seen in terms of which organisation is more or less effective. Rather, as neither is effective enough on its own to deal with either the range of security threats or the particularity of individual threats, there is a need for these two, as well as other, organisations to engage in complementary activities and to coordinate and reinforce their activities. This would help to ensure that the avowed norms of peace, stability and prosperity are enhanced, and that purposive security governance in Europe is achieved.







^1	 Endnotes For a review of the problems associated with “effectiveness” of security institutions, see Hill (2001).
^2	  The Alliance New Strategic Concept, North Atlantic Council in Rome, November 7-8, 1991, para. 12.
^3	  The Alliance Strategic Concept, North Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, April 23-24, 1999, para. 24. 
^4	  These were, in descending order of perceived threat: ethnic conflict, migratory pressures, specific environmental threats, narcotics trafficking, criminalisation of economies; macro-economic destabilization; terrorism against state structures, cyber-warfare against state/defence structures, cyber-warfare against commercial structures, general environmental threats; a nuclear attack; and a biological/chemical attack. For further details of this study, see Kirchner & Sperling (2002).
^5	  For a more elaborate description of these four security categories see European Commission (2002); Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/Conflict Prevention Network, eds., (1999); van Tongeren et al (2002); and Howell (2003). 
^6	  For example, of almost $15 billion disbursed in development assistance to the Balkans between 1993 and 1999, the European countries and the European Union spent $6.9 billion and $3.3 billion respectively. The EU and the European NATO allies also provided between 1990 and 1999 $20 billion of the approximately $35 billion aid to CIS states (Lindley-French, 2002).
^7	  At the EU-Russia summit of October 2000, the two partners agreed on a Joint Declaration on Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation on Political and Security Matters in Europe, which called for regular consultation on defence matters and discussions on modalities for Russia’s contribution to future EU crisis management operations. However, according to Dov Lynch (2003: 67), this dialogue “has produced few, if any, meaningful joint foreign policy positions”. 
^8	  For example, the US has 250 long-range transport planes and the Europeans have 11. There are plans to overcome the gap in strategic airlift capacity by modernizing the fleet with the A400m carrier (Dempsey, 2002).
^9	  Taken all together, the European members of NATO spent around $150 billion on defence in 2003, compared with some $380 billion for the US. Whereas the US budget represented a 20 percent increase over the year 2000, European defence spending has (with the exception of the British) fallen by more than 25% since 1987 (Dockrill, 2002:5).
^10	  Of course, because NATO works on unanimity, any one of the non-EU countries could veto the EU’s “borrowing” of NATO assets. Already Turkey made use of the veto in 2001/2002. For further details on the Turkey issue and the “Berlin-Plus” arrangements see  Missiroli (2002).
^11	  In early 2004, NATO took on responsibility for training Iraqi forces, but no operational tasks as the US and several European members states had wanted it to do. See Ulriksen and Bono (2004:569-570). 
^12	  Security governance consists of two concepts: governance and security. For details on the concept of governance see Pierre 2000, and for an attempt to combine governance and security see Webber et al, 2004.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